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RECENT DECISIONS

EMINENT DoMAIN - PowER OF THE FEDERAL GovERNMENT TO CoNDEMN LAND IN PUBLIC UsE FOR AN INCONSISTENT FEDERAL UsE - Defendants, landowners and next of kin of persons buried in a cemetery which was
being subjected to condemnation, moved to dismiss the federal government's
petition for condemnation of such lands on the grounds that the federal statutes
did not authorize the United States to take land already dedicated to a public
use for an inconsistent use; and that public cemeteries were not subject to the
United States' power of eminent domain. The land was being condemned to
effectuate a federal project under the National Industrial Recovery Act 1 and
the Federal Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1935,2 and was for public
purposes in furtherance of congressional powers. 3 The federal district court
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the United States had stated a cause
of action for condemnation of the cemetery. United States v. Sixty Acres of Land
in Williamson County, (D. C. Ill. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 368.
The right of eminent domain is a sovereign one, inherent in the federal
government. This right may be exercised without the consent of a state, in pursuance of the constitutionally delegated powers of Congress. 4 That a state cannot
condemn land already devoted to a federal use within its borders is now a
settled rule. 5 But the fact that land within a state is alre~dy devoted to a public
use does not place a similar limitation on the federal government's power to
condemn.e The extent of the national government's right of eminent domain
where the prospective federal use is inconsistent with the public purpose to which
not as a specific item of recovery but as affecting the market value of the leasehold.
4 SuTHERLAND, DAMAGES, 4th ed., § 1069, p. 4012 (1916), states: "If the tenant's
estate is limited to a particular use and the appliances used by him in conducting
business are rendered useless by an entry thereon, and it becomes necessary to reconstruct them, and thereby the expense of doing business is increased and the profits are
diminished by waste, all these matters may be proven as descriptive of the injury sustained and as affecting the market value of the lease, but not as specific items of damage." See ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE kw OF EMINENT DoMAIN, § 156 (1936),
for discussion of other instances where income might be an acceptable measure of market
value.
48 Stat. L. 200 et seq. (1933), 40 U. S. C. (1934), § 401 et seq.
49 Stat. L. 115 (1935), 15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 721-728, note.
3 United States v. Eighty Acres of Land in Williamson County, (D. C. Ill. 1939)
26 F. Supp. 3 15.
¾ Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875); Chappell v. United States, 160
U.S. 499, 16 S. Ct. 397 (1896).
5 A close question arises where federal land is not held for any public purpose.
Cf. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S. Ct. 995 (1885). NICHOLS,
EMINENT DoMAIN 23-30 (1909), I id., 2d ed.,§ 36 (1917).
6 United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 16 S. Ct. 427 (1896).
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the land has been put within the state is in some doubt. If the property is being
used by the state in the discharge of its necessary governmental functions, it is
possible that the courts might limit the federal government's power to condemn,
especially if the land is being sought by the federal government for reasons of
convenience and not necessity.1 Allowing the courts to go into questions involving the necessity of the federal purpose, however, seems rather dubious. Probably
the only question should be whether the taking of the land is necessary in carrying out the federal purpose; 8 and the answer to this question largely depends
upon the expressed intention of Congress. As the principal case points out, the
rule that the statute authorizing condemnation must apply, expressly or by
necessary implication, to the specific property to be taken where it is already
devoted to a public use, generally involves only those cases in which the right
of eminent domain has been given to public service or municipal corporations.9
Agents of the United States, however, may condemn lands which are needed
to carry out the more generally stated constitutional projects of Congress. 10
Land being used for a cemetery is not necessary to the functioning of a state;
and a state, in the exercise of its police powers, or Congress, in the exercise of
its delegated powers, may authorize its removal.11 To hold cemeteries sacred
from interference by governmental agencies, as well as private persons, might
well lead to absurd results, especially in densely populated areas.12 Therefore,

In any case, the exercise of the federal government's power to condemn is subject to
the limitation that just compensation for the land must be made. St. Louis v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., r48 U. S. 92 at 100-101, 13 S. Ct. 485 (1893).
7 "As the United States cannot interfere with the exercise by the states of their
proper functions, it would not be permissible for the United States to take land
actually used and required by a state or one of its subdivisions for public purposes,
merely as a matter of convenience; but as, in case of conflict, the federal powers are
supreme, land necessary for the performance of its proper functions could be taken by
the United States, however it was used by a state." IO R. C. L. 24 (1915). Cf. also,
N1cHoLS, EMINENT DoMAIN 23-30 (1909).
8 In Missouri ex rel. Camden County v. Union Electric Light & Power Co.,
(D. C. Mo. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 692, the defendant, a federal agency, given power by
the federal government to condemn land to erect a dam on a navigable stream, was
held entitled to condemn land then used for a school district, a court house, and a
county jail. United States v. Jotham Bixby Co., (D. C. Cal. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 317;
C. M. Patten Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 970 at 972.
9 United States v. Southern Power Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) 31 F. (2d) 852;
Masonic Cemetery Assn. v. Gamage, (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 950, 71 A. L. R.
1027 at 1040; City of Norton v. Lowden, (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 663.
The rule was :tlso applied to a county in Board of Commissioners for Clarendon County
v. Holliday, 182 S. C. 510, 189 S. E. 885 (1937).
1 ° Cf. United States v. Southern Power Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) 31 F. (2d)
8 52. The circuit court there held that the act of Congress authorizing condemnation
of land for forestry purposes did not reveal the intention of Congress to appropriate
land used for power transmission lines. There was no real showing, however, that the
uses were inconsistent and that the land was needed to carry out the federal purpose.
11 Annotation, 7 I A. L. R. 1040 ( I 931).
12 Campbell v. City of Kansas, 102 Mo. 326, 13 S. W. 897 (1890).

1940]

RECENT DECISIONS

165

granting that Congress may authorize condemnation of property being used
within a state as a cemetery, if it be necessary to carry out a congressiona\.
power, it is submitted that the intention of Congress to appropriate the cemetery
mvclved in the instant case was properly expressed. Furthermore, sound policy
would seem to favor this result in view of the extent and purpose of the National
Industrial Recovery Act.
Robert P. Kneeland

